蘭德報告《與中國開戰》

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pdf

In a nutshell, despite military trends that favor it, China could not win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025, espe- cially if prolonged. Moreover, the economic costs and political dangers of such a war could imperil China’s stability, end its development, and undermine the legitimacy of the state.
Yet in the event of war, the military capabilities, motivations, and plans of both sides make a severe, prolonged, and exceedingly costly conflict a distinct possibility. Of the many reasons the United States should not want such a war, the most important are the immense mili- tary losses and economic costs to itself and the implications, for the country, the region, and the world, of devastating harm to China. Such prospects underscore the importance of both the United States and China contemplating how to control and restrict fighting should a crisis turn violent, which shines the spotlight on principles and proce- dures for political control and communication.

引爆戰爭的5個火藥桶
1.中日在東中國海圍繞爭議領土的沖突，而美國聲稱其與日本的防禦條約也適用於此；
2. 在美國和平解決爭端和公海自由的極力主張面前，中國在（和對）南海竭力要求實現其領土主張的困擾——例如，針對菲律賓或越南 ；
‧3.中國、韓國或美國軍隊在朝鮮崩潰事件中不協調的軍事幹預；
‧4.中國大陸武力脅迫或奪取台灣的威脅；
‧5.海上事故，例如擊落飛機，原因是軍隊執行任務的地方近在咫尺，可能是在中國宣稱其享有主權的專屬經濟區、美國卻聲稱是公有的水域。

詭譎的思考
只有兩國對打，其他國家袖手旁觀？
俄羅斯，日本，東南亞各國，如何參戰？
中美國內的分裂？或是經濟政治因素考慮？


一個關鍵的問題是，是否有一方能在一場對方難以讓步的激烈戰鬥的早期就獲得明顯優勢。美國實現這種目標能力正由於中國A2AD能力的提高而降低。與此同時，中國方面不斷增長的阻止美軍獲得迅速和決定性勝利的能力，並不必然轉化為其能迅速結束戰爭的能力。

四個案例模型：短期低強度、長期低強度、短期高強度和長期高強度。